c. the affected populations should be similar.
4. Transfer the benefit estimates.
Address uncertainty.
Describing the "policy case" requires a theoretical framework that reflects the shape of the demand curve or utility function as well as the constraints faced by consumers.
Two benefit transfer methods are capable of ensuring the analysis is theoretically consistent: preference calibration (PC) and preference function transfer (PFT). Both approaches seek to estimate structural preference parameters for consumers and then transfer the corresponding utility function to the new policy application. The difference between the two methods is that PFT uses the results from a previous study to transfer a utility function (Zanderson, Termansen, and Jensen 2007) whereas PC uses previous value estimates to calibrate the parameters of a utility function posited by the benefittransfer practitioner (Smith, Pattanayak, and Van Houtven 2006) . In either case the utility function can be combined with information for the new policy (e.g. environmental quality change and consumer income and characteristics) to calculate partial equilibrium values at the policy site.
PC and PFT have both been used for benefit-cost analysis. For example benefitcost analyses of the Environmental Quality Incentives Program and the Conservation Security Program used Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen's (1999) random utility model of recreation demand to estimate benefits from water quality and wildlife habitat improvements from "environmental friendly" farming practices (e.g. USDA 2005).
Because PFT specifies the preference functions for consumers at the study and policy sites, it provides a convenient framework for formalizing the conditions required for benefit transfers to provide consistent value estimates for a new policy application.
A Conceptual Framework for Preference Function Transfer
This section introduces a unified conceptual framework for preference function estimation and transfer based on five assumptions that are jointly sufficient for PFTs to provide consistent estimates of partial equilibrium values. The benefit transfer objective is to compute a compensating variation (CV) value estimate for a change in environmental quality at the policy site. An individual consumer's utility can be written as a function of environmental quality (q), income ( y ), preferences (α ), and a vector of all other characteristics describing the consumer and the site ( Z ). Using this notation, CV is implicitly defined by equation (1):
The 0 and 1 superscripts denote environmental quality before and after the change, and the PS subscripts indicate that variables are measured at the policy site.
A PFT predicts CV at the policy site by combining a parametric estimate of ( ) ⋅ V from the study site with data on characteristics describing the policy site and its affected consumer population ( )
. We discuss the estimation and transfer processes in turn and define the assumptions that underlie each step.
can express consumer i's utility from choice j as ( 
Under the separability assumption, the full vector of preferences i α can be partitioned into preferences for observed site characteristics i β and preferences for unobserved site characteristics i γ . The role of separability is to guarantee that the marginal utility from environmental quality does not depend on variables which the researcher is unable to measure for the initial study. 
Transferring Preferences to the Policy Site
The first assumption is a stronger version of separability. Utility at the policy site is assumed to be separable in policy a all u d ch ASSUMPTION PS.1:
, where
Together, the two separability assumptions (SS.1 and PS.1) guarantee that unobserved characteristics cancel ou f the e ression for compensating variation. In other wor our inability to observe PS parability in unobserved characteristics, the PFT takes the estimate for
from the study site and adapts it to the policy site using PS data on q, X d, and y. This process must define the preference function for people at the policy site and their joint distribution of income and demographic characteristics. First, consider preference function. We assume the empirica , the l specification for preferences from the study site is equally valid for the policy site:
Equality of SS G and PS G means the parametric structure used to represent utility for the study site is sufficiently general that differences between the study site population and policy site population can be fully captured by differences in preference parameters, the site selection process is required to predict
Consistency of Partial Equilibrium Welfare Measures
Together, the five PFT assumptions allow us to develop a consistent estimator of compensating variation for the policy site population 
Notice that the expectation is taken with respect to the random component of preferenc 
to provide consistent partial equilibrium benefit measures for the policy site.
An example may help to fix ideas. Suppose our policy site data are limited to information on price q), and the study site preference function can be 
PS CV

Discussion
Testing the Four "S" Assumptions of Benefit Transfer
Perhaps the key implication of our conceptual framework is the need to test the four assumptions that underlie benefit transfers: separability, specification, sorting, and selection. Assumptions SS.1 and PS.1 state that utility is separable in unobserv characteristics. Separability is routinely invoked in random utility models for computational convenience. At present there is no formal test for separability, and the extent to which this assumption drives benefit estimates is unclear. Assumptions SS. In principle accomplishing assumption SS.2 is possible. We expect this assumption will be better met as the empirical literature evolves and better data management procedures are employed. Careful documentation of data and estimation will help others to judge a preference function specification. Objective evaluation is possible if, for example, the study site data are generated by a quasi-experimental proce that can be exploited to measure the relative performances of competing specifications (Provencher and Bishop 2004) . Even without such a design, the researcher can assess t sensitivity of parameter estimates to subjective modeling decisions (Kuminoff 2009 ).
While there is no bright-line rule here for when a study meets these criteria, the analyses cited above and other forms of sensitivity analysis conducted for the study site model can help to investigate the uncertainty associated with using a study site pr Testing the "no sorting" assumption is also important for evaluating the possibilities for using random parameter models for benefit transfer. Two key conditions must be satisfied for a random parameter model to provide valid transfer estimates. Th random component of heterogeneity in preferences for environmental quality must be described by the same statistical distribution at the study site and the policy site, and th two populations must share the same functional relationship between preferences demographics. For example, in order to transfer a preference function for beach restoration from Florida to southern California, we must be willing to assume that bo populations share the same distribution of marginal utility for beach length after we condition on their demographic by assumption PS.2.
Finally, assumption PS.3 requires that we know the incomes and demographic characteristics of the policy site population. This is trivial to test-we either have the data or we do not. It is less clear what can be done without the data. The seemingly obvious solution is to use Census data on people who live near the policy site. Yet, this approach raises the possibility of selection bias. We are unaware of any past work on the "site selection bias" that would arise from using proxy demographics from the Census (or other sources) to predict the characteristics of the policy site population. It is common the random utility literature to specify the probability of site selection as a functio demographic characteristics, and recent work has also suggested a role for social interactions (Timmins and Murdock 2007) . The challenge is to find a way to use this information to predict the subset of the local population that will select the location o policy site area in n of f the over available substitutes. This is another important topic for future ar cteristics research.
2
Implications for EPA's Benefit Transfer Guidelines
By adding rigor to the description of consumer behavior, our conceptual framework relaxes the rigidity of EPA's "Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses" to provide more flexibility in how benefits transfers can be conducted. The EPA guidelines require:
(i) the same basic commodities to be consumed at the study and policy sites; (ii) simil baseline levels of those commodities; and (iii) similar consumer populations. These requirements can be relaxed if one is willing to specify the preference functions that guide consumer behavior. First, consider the basic commodities. The study site and policy site commodities must both convey the same measure of environmental quality ( q ), for example, lake water clarity. The lake sites may differ in the other chara that they convey, as long as each lake can be consistently described by a set of characteristics (Z), and utility is separable in the characteristics that cannot be measured at all lakes (ξ ). Differences in commodities are taken into account during the transfer process by calibrating the utility function using the available policy site data.
Second, consider the levels of each commodity and the size of the change at the policy site. As long as our structural specification for the preference function is accurate, we can use it to assess the partial equilibrium welfare implications from any policy site. Of course this is predicated on the assumption that the range of environmental quality at th change at the e study site is sufficient to identify the structural parameters of the pre ed for fer ces in the characteristics of study and policy sites. Finally, our restrictions on sorting and selection relax the need for similar populations. The study site and policy site populations may differ as long as the systematic variation in their preferences for environmental quality is fully explained by observable demographic characteristics (i.e., the transfer estimate can be calibrat such differences through d). The main implication here is that the EPA transfer conditions do not need to be treated as strict requirements as long as the benefit trans method is capable of calibrating for the relevant differen people and their choices at the
Conclusions and Next Steps
Previous work on the methodology of benefit transfer has sought to establish broad, informal guidelines for the transfer process. In contrast we have defined the specific assumptions that make benefit transfers work. While we have defined these assump in the context of PFT, they are not unique to this method. They serve as necessary conditions for any theoretically consistent approach to benefit transfer. Preference function transfer simply provides a convenien tions and consider their implications.
In reduced-form frameworks of PFTs, such as meta-analysis, the four "S" (4S assumptions-separability, specification, sorting, and selection-are implicit in th transfer process. Violations of the study site assumptions (SS.1-2) will generate measurement error in the dependent variable of a meta-regression, and violations o policy site assumptions (PS.1-3) will confound the model's external validity. For example a meta-analysis that uses past estimates for welfare measures from one site t predict welfare at a different site implicitly assumes that any systematic variation in preferences between the two populations is explained by the observable characteristics o the population that serve as regressors. While the 4S assumptions are sufficient for the validity of a structural PFT, they are not sufficient to ensure the validity of a reducedform transfer. In addition to satisfying the 4S assumptions, a meta-regression mus be correctly specified and sample selection issues m It is also important to underscore that our analysis reflects a partial equilibrium perspective. We have held prices fixed, and we have implicitly assumed that people do not adjust their behavior in response to changes in quality. While this seems extreme, it may provide a reasonable approximation for the short-run response to moderate change A partial equilibrium perspective is clearly less appropriate for large changes th force people to adjust immediately or even relatively small changes where the incremental cost of adjustment is minimal. Extending our analysis to consider gene equilibrium adjustment would require us to address a fifth "S"-substitution. We conjecture that one could make consistent predictions for general equilibrium welfare es using data on the substitution possibilities faced by the policy site populati Overall, our analysis suggests a new direction for future research on benefit transfer methodology. By pursuing an agenda of testing the structural assumptions that underlie benefit transfers, we can identify which (if any) assumptions are systematicall violated, assess the consequences, and look for solutions. In ongoing research we using simulation methods to assess the relative importance of violating each "S" assumption in a policy relevant application of PFT. Preliminary results suggest that y are elfare measures are particularly sensitive to violations of the "no sorting" condition. w
